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tensive studies regarding problems facing
the state.
Under the director of the Assembly's
bipartisan Committee on Policy Research,
AOR investigates current state issues and
publishes reports which include long-term
policy recommendations. Such investigative projects often result in legislative action, usually in the form of bills.
AOR also processes research requests
from Assemblymembers. Results of these
short-term research projects are confidential unless the requesting legislators authorize their release.

■ MAJOR PROJECTS
Economic Development Assistance
Programs in State Government {April
1993) provides information on California's
existing economic development assistance
programs and discusses programs which
have proven successful in other states. AOR
estimates that over 30 different state agencies are currently administering more than
125 economic development programs in
California. Although a number of entry
points exist which provide limited access to
economic development assistance, AOR
found no single, easily accessible entry point
for comprehensive assistance in key areas of
the state; AOR also found that despite a
myriad of economic development assistance
programs, gaps exist in California programs
for technology innovation. AOR noted that
some existing and proposed state programs
could fill those gaps; however, before adding to programs which are already disorganized by function and agency, AOR suggested that California officials learn from
programs that have worked in other states
which experienced severe economic problems in the 1980s.
AOR's specific recommendations for
change include creating a single, easily
accessible entry point in key areas of the
state for comprehensive economic development assistance; linking industry clusters and government with universities to
tum research into products and jobs; improving the productivity of mature industries; leveraging public resources with private sector and nonprofit institution resources; and funding state programs based
on performance.
Putting the Pieces Together: A Status
Report on Integrated Child and Family
Services (February 1993), part of AOR's
California Children, California Families
series, describes pioneering attempts in
California to redesign delivery systems
for child and family services; identifies
obstacles encountered by such efforts and
the institutional and political barriers to
their expansion; and describes specific options for overcoming those barriers. AOR
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notes that communities throughout California are inventing new systems for service delivery; although the programs vary
greatly, most can be described as comprehensive, flexible, and holistic, prevention-oriented, family-centered, neighborhood-based/culturally sensitive, governed
by collaborative leadership with shared
resources, and accountable to program
participants.
The report then describes four local
programs which have been implemented
to coordinate various services for children
and families. For example, Sacramento
County's "Cities in Schools" program is
"committed to helping children succeed in
school and to strengthening family life so
that families in trouble can begin taking
on more and more responsibility for the
successful raising of their children." Since
1988, Cities in Schools has led a collaborative effort in Sacramento County to provide social, educational, and health services to children in danger of dropping out
of school, as well as to their families.
Fresno County's "K-SIX" program is
aimed at identifying children at an early
age who are likely to drop out of school,
and working with the school and family to
address barriers to school success. Yolo
County's "PEARLS" (People Emerging
and Reaching Lifeline Success) program
combines education and support services
for the pregnant and parenting minors program of the County Office of Education
and the Greater Avenues for Independence
(GAIN) program. Finally, San Diego's
"New Beginnings" is described as an ambitious attempt by the City of San Diego,
County of San Diego, San Diego City
Schools, San Diego Community College
District, San Diego Housing Commission,
UC San Diego Medical School, and
Children's Hospital to change the entire
delivery system for health, human services, and education.
The report states that various obstacles
or barriers to these and similar efforts include a lack of adequate facilities or space,
lack of funding, confidentiality concerns,
lack of collaboration, state-level fragmentation, and program inflexibility. According to AOR, the options available to the
state in order to overcome these problems
include the following:
-developing legislation which will
designate a portion of future bond funds
for integrated services facilities;
-simplifying eligibility standards,
changing funding rules, emphasizing a
more holistic view of services, and allowing local integrated child and family services programs more flexibility to provide
the highest-priority services identified by
the local community;

-exploring new federal funding
sources for which the state is eligible; and
-developing a task force on professional development for integrated children and family services to examine current professional training programs, review credentialing and licensing requirements, identify exemplary multidisciplinary programs, and recommend changes
in current programs, credentials, and licenses which would enhance collaboration.
AOR is expected to release a follow-up
paper in December describing the progress of the efforts, reassessing the barriers,
and, if appropriate, recommending additional specific legislation.

SENATE OFFICE
OF RESEARCH
Director: Elisabeth Kersten
(916) 445-1727
stablished and directed by the Senate
Committee on Rules, the Senate Office of Research (SOR) serves as the bipartisan, strategic research and planning
unit for the Senate. SOR produces major
policy reports, issue briefs, background
information on legislation and, occasionally, sponsors symposia and conferences.
Any Senator or Senate committee may
request SOR 's research, briefing, and consulting services. Resulting reports are not
always released to the public.
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■ MAJOR PROJECTS
How Safe? Issues Raised by the Proposed Ward Valley Low-Level Radioactive Waste Facility (January 1993) summarizes outstanding safety and liability
issues facing California's plan to authorize US Ecology to locate and operate a
low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) facility at Ward Valley, located in San Bernardino County.
The federal Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act of 1980 gave states the
responsibility for managing their own
commercial LLRW facilities, encouraged
states to enter multi-state compacts to
safely manage the waste on a regional
basis, and allowed compact regions to exclude LLRW generated outside their regions from their disposal sites beginning
in 1986. In 1985, Congress amended those
provisions to extend the deadline for states
to enter into compacts and develop regional LLRW facilities, establish specific
milestones for the siting and construction
of new LLRW disposal facilities along
with incentives and penalties to prompt
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states to meet those goals, and extend the
date after which states and compacts with
waste facilities may close their borders to
out-of-state and out-of-compact wastes to
January I, 1993.
At one time, six commercial disposal
sites operated nationally, all constructed
between 1962 and 1971; those facilities
were located in Kentucky, New York,
Illinois, Washington, Nevada, and South
Carolina. The Kentucky, New York, and
Illinois facilities were closed in the 1970s
due to environmental problems; Nevada
closed its facility effective January I,
1993, in response to numerous operating
violations. Also effective January I,
Washington closed its facility to California waste.
In preparation for the January I, 1993
effective date of the federal amendments,
California, Arizona, North Dakota, and
South Dakota formed the Southwest Compact, and California agreed to provide a
LLRW disposal facility for the first thirty
years for wastes originating in the four
states comprising the compact. The terms
of the agreement require California to ensure that public health and safety are protected in the siting and operation of the
facility, and that charges for disposal of
LLRW are sufficient to pay for the safe
disposal of LLRW and long-term care of
the regional disposal facility. Additionally, the Department of Health Services
(OHS) adopted regulations for selection
of a LLRW facility license designee and
for the ultimate licensure of a LLRW facility operator; the regulations called for
the rank ordering of applicants in accordance with their demonstrated ability to
meet established financial standards, provide the best concept for site development
and operations, present an effective program to deal with concerns of the public
regarding establishing a LLRW disposal
site, and establish a reasonable schedule
of charges for disposal of LLRW. According to SOR, the application submitted by
US Ecology received the lowest rank of
the four received by OHS; however, the
other three companies subsequently declined to pursue their proposals and US
Ecology, the sole remaining applicant, became the license designee in 1985. From
1982-84, OHS also identified 18 desert
basins in the Mojave Desert as the most
likely places for siting a LLRW facility; in
1988, US Ecology formally designated
Ward Valley as the proposed project location.
However, the facility was not built by
January I, 1993. The project is still under
review by the federal Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) and DHS, and last
year OHS promised the Senate Rules

Committee it would conduct an evidentiary hearing on the environmental impacts of the proposed LLRW facility
{ 12:2&3 CRLR 13-14}; at this writing,
that agreement is the subject of litigation.
The Southwest Compact recently negotiated an agreement with the Southeast
Compact; pursuant to this agreement, California may dispose of its LLRW in a
South Carolina facility until mid-1994 so
long as it makes continued progress toward siting its own LLRW facility.
In its report, SOR identified the following safety and liability issues regarding US Ecology's proposal:
• Potential for Waste Migration and
Groundwater Contamination. According
to SOR, project proponents contend that
Ward Valley is a superior site and suitable
for a shallow land burial facility due to its
arid conditions, the nature of soil conditions, and the distance of groundwater
from the site surface. US Ecology and
OHS rely on extensive waste transport
modeling efforts and assumptions about
groundwater movement to conclude that,
even if released, wastes would take thousands of years to reach groundwater, if
they reach it at all; these assumptions are
based on findings that, due to the arid
conditions, moisture in the soil moves upward rather than downward. However,
SOR notes that actual measurements at the
site indicate that the waste tritium, which
occurs both naturally and from nuclear
testing fallout, has already migrated at
least 100 feet downward in less than 35
years.
OHS also contends that Ward Valley is
a topographically "closed" basin with no
surface drainage to adjacent basins or the
Colorado River, a prime source of drinking water to millions of U.S. and Mexican
residents; according to the environmental
impact report/statement (EIR/S) on the
project, groundwater under the Ward Valley site drains southward, away from the
Colorado River. However, SOR contends
that the EIR/S overlooked evidence that
increasing use of the two aquifers to the
north of Ward Valley by the city of Needles and other users may eventually reverse the groundwater flow. Also, SOR
contends that the conclusions of the EIR/S
conflict with findings of a 1984 U.S. Geological Survey which found that the Ward
Valley aquifer is a basin from which
groundwater drains in a southerly direction to the Colorado River. Also, SOR
notes that some critics contend that if surface evaporation produces upward migration of moisture through the soil at the site,
as claimed by OHS, radioactivity could
migrate back to the surface, where it could
be released into the atmosphere and trans-
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ported over the surrounding area, including the Colorado River.
• Adequacy of Shallow Trench
Burial. According to the report, a number
of experts contend that shallow trench
burial, the method of disposal proposed by
US Ecology, is unreliable; better alternatives are available and should be considered.
• Lack of Consideration of Measures
to Minimize Waste Disposal. According
to SOR, neither OHS nor BLM, the lead
agencies for the project, have given serious consideration to alternatives to minimize the environmental consequences of
a LLRW disposal facility in California.
Such alternatives include the recovery of
tritium, which many experts contend can
be economically recycled if I 00 curies of
waste are annually available for treatment;
market-based incentives for conservation
and recycling of LLRW; and storage to
decay-either onsite or in centralized facilities-for the relatively small amount
of LLRW which results from nuclear medical treatment.
• Risks of Waste Stream Understated.
SOR notes that because utility nuclear
power plant wastes are considerably more
hazardous in terms of half-life and radioactivity than LLRW produced by other
sources, determining the exact make-up of
the waste stream entering Ward Valley is
critical to determining both the degree of
risk and the adequacy of the proposed
facility. According to OHS, only about 6%
(in terms of radioactivity, not volume) of
the total wastes expected to be shipped to
Ward Valley is from electric utilities,
while 10% is from industry sources, 79%
is from medical sources, and roughly 5%
is from government and academic
sources. However, SOR contends that
OHS' waste stream figures are contradicted both by figures collected by the
U.S. Department of Energy, which indicate that in terms of activity, utilities nationally produce close to 90% of all
LLRW, and by the documented waste
stream of generators in the Southwest
Compact, which indicates that utilities accounted for47% of total LLRW generated
over the four-year period from I987-91.
• Lack of Redundancy System for
Waste Containment. According to the report, experts advise that the ideal LLRW
containment scheme is one that relies on
multiple containment features to ensure
control of the waste, should any one layer
of protection fail; both the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the California Integrated Waste Management Board
have recommended that trench liners and
leachate collection systems be included as
part of a comprehensive monitoring and
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containment scheme for Ward Valley.
However, US Ecology's application does
not propose a multiple containment system and instead relies mainly on the natural characteristics of the site to contain the
wastes. Further, US Ecology's proposal
does not call for wastes to be shipped in
state-of-the-art containers; according to
DHS, packaging to be used for the more
hazardous LLRW can only be expected to
last for 20-30 years, far less than the hazardous life of most LLRW.
• Operator Track Record. According
to SOR, two of the three LLRW facilities
which have experienced contamination
problems in other states were operated by
US Ecology; also, the Nevada site operated by US Ecology was closed effective
January I, I 993, due in part to operating
violations at the facility. The report states
that the company's track record was one
of the reasons it scored the lowest of the
four applicants seeking to be the state's
license designee.
• Financial Responsibility for Damages Caused by Unplanned Releases. According to a comprehensive analysis of
liability issues prepared by the
Controller's Office, the financial safeguards proposed by DHS to cover liability
for injuries resulting from unplanned releases of LLRW are inadequate to protect
the state's taxpayers for long-term damages resulting from operation of the facility. AB 2500 (Sher) in the I 991-92 legislative session would have addressed many
of the liability issues by-among other
things-raising the minimum required
amount of insurance from $10 million to
$ I 5 million, establishing a $25 million
third party liability fund financed by a
surcharge on waste disposal, requiring the
license to expressly authorize the Governor to close the facility if the federal government or Compact Commission authorizes the receipt of out-of-compact waste,
and making the operator of an LLRW facility, generators, and transporters absolutely, jointly and severally liable for damages resulting from the release of LLRW
into the environment. However, Governor
Wilson vetoed by bill, opining that the
establishment of liability requirements for
the facility was better left to the Secretary
of Health and Welfare. { I 2:4 CRLR I I J
• Risk of Ward Valley Becoming a National Repository. SOR notes that there
are two principal mechanisms under
which Ward Valley could be opened up to
out-of-compact waste. First, the Southwest Compact can accept waste from any
out-of-compact state if a majority of compact commission members vote to do so
and DHS prepares a report assessing the
environmental and economic effects of
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importing the waste. By virtue of being the
initial host state for a LLRW facility, California currently controls a majority of
seats on the Commission and could theoretically block the acceptance of out-ofstate wastes for the duration that Ward
Valley is operational. However, since the
effect of admitting additional wastes will
be to spread Ward Valley's operating
costs, which are already expected to be the
highest in the nation when and if the facility opens, and reduce disposal fees to instate generators, SOR contends that there
will be intense pressure to admit additional wastes.
Also, the emergency access provisions
of the federal Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act permit the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to force a
compact to accept LLRW if it determines
there is an immediate and serious threat to
public health or security and that the threat
cannot be mitigated in any other way. Although NRC has assured California that it
views the emergency access provisions as
a last resort mechanism, critics contend
that this position may change now that one
of the three existing sites has permanently
closed and the other two have taken steps
to restrict access to their facilities.
• Problems with LLRW C/asslfu:ation
System. SOR notes that a number of experts disagree with NRC's waste classification scheme, which classifies wastes according to the process which produces
them and not according to the hazardous
life of the radioactive materials contained
in them; these experts contend that NRC's
classification scheme allows wastes to remain at hazardous levels long after the
established timeframes.
SOR concludes that, despite being
under review for many years, numerous
safety and liability issues concerning the
proposed Ward Valley LLRW disposal facility remain unresolved. According to
SOR, "[a]s the history with LLRW disposal sites in other states attests, licensing
the Ward Valley facility before these issues are fully resolved could prove to be
very costly to the state, both economically
and environmentally."
Report on the Prison Industry Authority (January 1993) is based on a 1992

review of the Prison Industry Authority
(PIA) by the Senate's Advisory Commission on Cost Control in State Government.
According to the report, PIA employs over
8,000 inmates in the California prison system (approximately 8% of the prison population) and operates under a statutory
mandate to provide inmates with training
and experience that will assist them when
they seek to join the outside working population; PIA is directed to accomplish this

goal by replicating as closely as possible
the outside work environment, in conjunction with relevant education, training, and
post-release placement. PIA, which has a
non-inmate staff of745, operates 7 I enterprises at 19 facilities; the enterprises involve a number of areas such as furniture
manufacturing, hog raising, coffee roasting, laundering, and printing.
The Commission found that many PIA
products are not competitive with those
produced in the private sector based simply on pricing, and working conditions
within PIA do not encourage the productivity and innovation necessary for free
market survival. Noting that the objective
of making the PIA program financially
self-supporting may be unrealistic, the
Commission suggested that the Department of Corrections decide whether PIA
is a business that must operate on a forprofit basis, or whether the Authority's
programs provide a non-economic benefit
that justifies a state subsidy. The Commission also noted that a desire for cost-effectiveness should be balanced with the presently unknown cost of lowering prison
recidivism through PIA's education and
training opportunities.
The Commission found that PIA needs
to develop a more business-oriented
workforce by exempting certain managerial and supervisory positions from the
state's civil service system and establishing a realistic incentive system that rewards employee productivity. According
to the report, PIA is constrained in its
ability to hire and terminate managerial
and supervisory personnel in a manner
that meets the needs of a profit-making
business, and the civil service rules do not
allow for free market methods of dealing
with the business cycle, such as layoffs
during slack periods or hiring temporary
help during upturns. Also, PIA does not
presently provide employee incentives
typically found in the private sector, such
as additional vacation time, salary raises,
and bonuses to encourage greater employee productivity; the Commission
noted that while a normal free market
measurement of productivity would be
difficult to meet in a prison environment,
PIA should try to establish incentives that
would reward non-prisoner employees.
The Commission also found that PIA's
financial statements omit a number of
state subsidies, and thus present an inaccurate picture of the Authority's financial
condition. For example, PIA often pays
rent at below market rates, has fully subsidized insurance, and is exempt from
sales tax on its products. These factors
tend to give PIA special treatment that
private vendors do not receive. Exclusion
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of these factors from PIA's financial
statement's leads to misleadingly optimistic reports on PIA's financial condition.
Because PIA's main goal is to successfully reintegrate ex-offenders into the free
world, the Commission opined that the
work programs should replicate as closely
as possible free world production and service operations. Because this successful
reintegration has potentially high societal
payoffs in cost savings, the Commission
suggested that PIA do everything possible
to prepare the inmates for work in the
outside world, such as taking an inmate's
parole date into consideration and assigning work involving marketable skills to
those inmates who have less than five
years remaining in their terms; PIA should
also place a high priority on requiring
inmates to reach a minimum level of literacy as a condition of employment.
To make the prison work environment
more similar to the outside world, the
Commission recommended that PIA institute a system-wide application and interview process and require transitional services for all inmates prior to their release,
to make their transition into society easier.
The cost of a mandatory system-wide program could be recouped from the savings
resulting from a reduction in the number
of participants returning to prison. The
Commission suggested that the Department of Corrections evaluate the effectiveness of its existing Pre-Release Education Program to determine whether the
Program should be mandatory for all inmates before parole.
Finally, the Commission noted that
PIA should attempt to ensure that prison
work skills are marketable in the private
sector, and expressed concern that PIA
does not place enough emphasis on selecting enterprises that offer a high degree of
employment potential for an inmate once
he/she has returned to society.
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